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Abstract—Web applications are a fundamental pillar of today’s 
globalized world. Society depends and relies on them for 
business and daily life. However, web applications are under 
constant attack by hackers that exploit their vulnerabilities to 
access valuable assets and disrupt business. Many studies and 
reports on web application security problems analyze the 
victim’s perspective by detailing the vulnerabilities publicly 
disclosed. In this paper we present a field study on the 
attacker’s perspective by looking at over 300 real exploits used 
by hackers to attack web applications. Results show that SQL 
injection and Remote File Inclusion are the two most 
frequently used exploits and that hackers prefer easier rather 
than complicated attack techniques. Exploit and vulnerability 
data are also correlated to show that, although there are many 
types of vulnerabilities out there, only few are interesting 
enough for attackers to obtain what they want the most: root 
shell access and admin passwords. 
Keywords- Security; Exploit; Vulnerability; Web application; 
Field study 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In less than two decades, the World Wide Web was able 
to radically change the way people communicate and do 
business. From individuals to large organizations, everyone 
uses the web. In fact, web applications quickly spread all 
over the world in the form of personal web sites, blogs, 
news, social networks, webmails, forums, e-commerce 
applications, among others. In developed countries, even 
critical infrastructures like water supply, power supply, 
banking, insurance, stock market, retail, communications, 
defense, etc. rely on networks, on the web and on 
applications that run in these distributed environments. 
As the importance of the assets accessed and managed by 
web applications increases, so does the natural interest of 
malicious minds in exploiting this new streak. Frequently, 
web applications developed with a strong focus on 
functionality and usability find themselves under heavy 
attack by hackers and organized crime, exploiting their 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities [1, 2, 3, 4]. The pressure to 
take advantage of web application assets is huge, thus it is 
not a surprise to see numerous reports of successful security 
breaches and exploitations [5, 6, 7]. 
After years of uncontrolled software development 
processes and practices, we now face the challenge of 
securing millions of existing web applications and 
developing new ones with good security embedded. The high 
number of regulations put into place by governments and 
corporations in recent years reflects the increasing concern 
top managers now have about web security. However, there 
are some significant factors that still make securing web 
applications a task hard to fulfill. Some examples are the fast 
growing market, their high exposure to attacks and the 
general lack of knowledge or experience in the area of 
security from those who develop and manage these 
applications. 
In spite of all security-related efforts, web applications 
are typically deployed with security vulnerabilities that make 
them vulnerable to attacks. This suggests that web 
developers and researchers still need to know more about 
vulnerabilities and attacks to mitigate them more effectively. 
Web application vulnerability analysis has been addressed by 
recent studies from several points of view [1, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11]. 
The attacker’s perspective has also been of some focus in the 
literature ([12, 13, 14, 15], among others), but mainly from 
empirical data gathered by the authors highlighting social 
networking and what could be obtained from attacking 
specific vulnerabilities. Some studies analyze the attack from 
the victim's perspective, like the proposal of a taxonomy to 
classify attacks based on their similarities [16] and the 
analysis of the attack traces from HoneyPots to separate the 
attack types [17]. There is, however, a lack of knowledge 
about existing exploits and their correlation with the targeted 
vulnerabilities. 
Important aspects that help understand web application 
attacks are what vulnerabilities are exploited, what assets 
hackers usually target, how these attacks are performed and 
the techniques actually used to execute them. This valuable 
data can be obtained by analyzing real attacks on web 
applications and the tools used to execute these attacks. In 
this paper we address the security of web applications 
focusing on the attacker’s perspective. To have a broader 
view of the attacker panorama we analyzed over three 
hundred real exploits targeting vulnerabilities of six widely 
used LAMP (Linux, Apache, Mysql and PHP) web 
applications. These exploits are publicly available in a 
hacker related site [18] and they have been downloaded over 
three million times from that site by potential attackers. 
Some of the exploits have also been adapted as modules of 
the Metasploit framework, widely used for generic 
penetration testing and vulnerability exploitation [19]. 
In this field study, exploits are analyzed from various 
dimensions to understand what types of vulnerabilities 
attackers prefer, what the goals of attacks are and how they 
are performed. The exploit data is also compared with 
vulnerability data of web applications to help unveil some 
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behaviors, like whether the most common vulnerabilities are 
the ones that hackers prefer to attack. 
The information resulting from this study can be used in 
security related scenarios, to help directing security 
practitioners to the most common attack types, to better 
protect the assets and to properly configure their 
environment. In fact, results confirm and enforce that some 
well-known security measures can prevent some real 
devastating attacks. For example, implementing policies like 
giving the lowest privilege to Operating System (OS) users 
that own network services, using strong passwords or cease 
using the register_globals = 1 PHP directive can prevent 
many exploits from achieving their goal. Finally, field study 
data can be valuable to improve security mechanisms, like 
the payload generator of a web application attack injector 
[20], the training of penetration testers and the procedures 
they use in the process. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Next section 
presents the target web applications and the field study 
methodology. Section III details the types of exploits found. 
Section IV analyses the field data and discusses the results. 
Section V concludes the paper. 
II. FIELD STUDY ON WEB APPLICATION EXPLOITS 
A vulnerability is a weakness (an internal software bug) 
that may be exploited to cause harm, although its presence 
does not cause harm by itself [21]. However, a vulnerability 
is a precondition for an attack (a malicious external fault) to 
cause an error and possibly subsequent failures [22]. The 
exploit is the piece of code that is used to maliciously take 
advantage of a given vulnerability. 
A web application exploit may be as simple as a specially 
crafted URL or as complex as an automated program with 
hundreds of lines of code that can be compiled and executed. 
Failures may occur due to attacks performed on a weakness 
in the security (vulnerability) of the application, which 
allows a malicious user to bypass security attributes like 
Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation, Confidentiality, 
Availability and Authorization [12]. This malicious action 
allows the attacker to gain access and to tamper with 
inappropriate resources and assets within the web application 
or the server computer: unauthorized access to data like 
credit card numbers and passwords, use privileged database 
accounts, impersonate another user (such as the 
administrator), mimic web applications, deface web pages, 
obtain access to the web server as the root user, install 
malicious programs and backdoors, etc.  
In this section we present the target web applications 
used in the field study and the methodology followed to 
analyze the exploits of their vulnerabilities. 
A. Web Applications 
This field study analyses the exploits of six widely used 
and well-known web applications: PHP-Nuke (phpnuke.org), 
Drupal (drupal.org), PHP-Fusion (php-fusion.co.uk), 
WordPress (wordpress.org), phpMyAdmin 
(phpmyadmin.net) and phpBB (phpbb.com). Drupal, PHP-
Fusion and phpBB are Web Content Management Systems 
(CMS). CMS is an application that allows an individual or a 
community of users to easily create and administer web sites 
that publish a variety of contents. PHP-Nuke is a well-known 
web based news automation system built as a community 
portal. News can be submitted by registered users and 
commented by the community. WordPress is a personal blog 
publishing platform that also supports the creation of easy to 
administer web sites. phpMyAdmin is a web based MySQL 
administration tool. It is one of the most popular PHP 
applications and has a huge deployment base. 
The web applications considered have a large community 
of users and belong to a class of applications that has a large 
spectrum of adoption. They have also won several prizes 
(some are Sourceforge and Open Source CMS finalists and 
winners [23, 24]) and are considered among the best in their 
class. All these web applications are developed using LAMP 
(Linux, Apache, Mysql and PHP), which is a combination of 
the most common technologies used by web applications 
around the world. Linux is mostly used as the chosen OS for 
servers, MySQL is the world’s most popular database, 
Apache is a leader in web servers and PHP web sites have 
about 1/3 of the worldwide market share [25]. 
These same web applications were also previously used 
in a field study on security vulnerabilities [8], in which the 
authors analyzed the classes of vulnerabilities that are the 
most frequent in web applications. Using the same web 
applications makes it possible to correlate exploit results 
with information about the vulnerabilities that are being 
exploited. This can be done at least for XSS and SQL 
Injection vulnerabilities, which are the two most common 
vulnerabilities in web applications [1] and were the focus of 
the field study presented in [8]. 
B. Field Study Methodology 
The field study consisted in the analysis of pieces of code 
developed to take advantage of vulnerabilities in web 
applications. These are the kind of exploits used by hackers 
and script kiddies to attack widely spread web applications, 
like the ones considered in this work. As the goal is to 
examine the inner workings of the exploits, for the analysis 
we need their source code. This may seem a big constraint, 
but it is quite common to find web application exploits 
available in their source code version. One reason for this is 
because they are usually developed in scripting languages, 
like PERL, PHP or HTML. Another reason seems to be the 
developers’ will to raise their rank within the hacker 
community for their accomplishments, which may justify the 
presence of the source code of exploits developed using 
compiled languages, like C, C# or ASP. 
The web application exploits were obtained from the 
Milw0rm web site [18]. This is a hacker related site 
containing around ten thousand exploits and whose 
contributors belong to several hacking groups. It is one of the 
most popular exploit databases and it is the largest that we 
are aware of. The site has a collection of exploits of 
vulnerabilities already fixed, but has also some 0 day 
vulnerabilities, for which no solution is available yet. Many 
of the exploits present in the Milw0rm site are also 
distributed by other hacker and security related sites, like the 
RedOracle (redoracle.com), SecurityReason 
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(securityreason.com), SecurityFocus (securityfocus.com) and 
osvdb (osvdb.org). Some Milw0rm exploits are available as 
modules of the Metasploit framework [19], which is widely 
used by hackers and security practitioners for penetration 
testing and vulnerability detection. 
In order to have a coherent data set, we gathered all the 
exploits (for the target web applications) from the Milw0rm 
database at the same time, so that no exploit was added after 
we started our analysis. Although we were also comparing 
the exploits with the vulnerabilities of the field study 
presented in [8], we did not restrict our search to XSS and 
SQL Injection, as our goal was to have a holistic view of the 
distribution of all types of exploits. We also did not restrict 
the exploit release date in order to be able to get a picture of 
the variation of the exploits over time. 
All the exploits collected were manually analyzed in 
detail. This allowed us to obtain inside information about 
how they were built, including: the language used, the 
vulnerable variables attacked, the attack entry point, etc. This 
also helped us to confirm whether the exploit type 
classification referred by the Milw0rm site is correct.  
By analyzing the source code we can accurately classify 
each exploit. In the files downloaded, we found cases in 
which several exploits were depicted together. These cases 
are usually (but not always) differentiated from the others by 
having the text “Multiple Vulnerabilities” somewhere in 
their names. When each of these exploits attacks different 
vulnerabilities in its own specific way (XSS, SQL Injection, 
etc.), we considered them as representing different exploits. 
On the other side, when we found in the same exploit file 
similar ways to exploit the same vulnerability we accounted 
them as a single exploit. As an example let us consider a 
SQL Injection vulnerability that allows the attacker to get 
access to a list of user names using a specific attack string. 
Let us also assume that this vulnerability can be exploited to 
obtain the list of passwords just by replacing the query’s user 
name field with the password field in the same attack string. 
We accounted situations like these as a single exploit and we 
classified the level of damage as the most damaging (in this 
case, the disclosure of both user names and passwords). This 
decision also makes sense if we think about some complex 
exploits (that account as a single exploit), like blind SQL 
Injection, where the attack is done in several stages 
exploiting the same vulnerable variable in a loop over and 
over until all the valuable field data is finally obtained. 
C. Field Study Remarks 
Using the guidelines presented above, we collected 312 
single exploits that overall had been downloaded, at the time 
of this study 3,249,484 times. The quantity of exploits used 
is certainly a subset of all the exploits developed for the 
target web applications. Moreover, we are also aware that 
there may be some other exploits outside the Milw0rm site. 
However, using exploits from a single repository does not 
mean that they come from a restricted elite of hackers. In 
fact, anyone can upload an exploit to the Milw0rm site and 
the data analyzed came from 118 different authors. 
As final remarks of our methodology, we should 
emphasize that we assume the number of downloads of the 
exploits shown in the Milw0rm site to be merely indicative. 
We cannot nor intend to assure that it represents the strict 
number of times the exploits were used, or even downloaded 
from the web. We know that some downloads were not used 
to attack any site (like we did); some attackers can download 
the same exploit from other sites (like those sites referred 
earlier); the exploits can be shared by other channels like the 
IRC  (highly used by hackers) or email; and they can also be 
used in specific attack tools, like the Metasploit [19]. 
Despite these remarks, that are unavoidable and 
omnipresent in every web related study, the data used is real 
and the field study results are repeatable. They are not easily 
generalized, at least for web applications not using the 
LAMP technology. More data should be analyzed to have a 
broader knowledge of how attacks are being performed on 
other web applications we use every day. However, our 
results do contribute to improve web application security, 
because they unveil how some vulnerabilities are really 
being exploited, which by itself should be enough to trigger 
the awareness for new security procedures. 
III. FIELD STUDY VULNERABILITIES AND EXPLOITS 
The Open Web Application Security Project Foundation 
(OWASP) released a report on the ten most critical web 
application security risks [10], based on the vulnerability 
data provided by Mitre Corporation. In this section we 
present the seven types of exploits we found in our field 
study and how they relate to the OWASP Top 10 list of web 
application risks. We shall see that most of the attacks also 
exploit the most common vulnerabilities. 
1) Bruteforce/Dictionary 
These exploits attack the third most common web 
application risk of the OWASP top ten 2010 list [10]: 
“Broken Authentication and Session Management”. We 
found only one exploit of this nature, developed by DarkFig 
[18], and it attacks the weaknesses in the passwords typically 
used in web applications [26] and the application logic.  In 
fact, it is common to find applications that allow users to try 
endless passwords without any sort of counter measures, like 
maximum number of attempts, response delay on error or 
using a two-factor authentication (a password and an 
additional authentication item like a token) [27]. 
The exploit we found gives the attacker the option of 
choosing to use a brute force or a dictionary attack: 
• The brute force attack can be further configured to 
use lower case or upper case alphabetic characters or 
even numeric characters. The starting length of the 
password to be guessed is also configurable. The 
exploit does simple iterations until it guesses the 
correct password of the victim whose user name in 
the application must be known previously. In spite of 
being able to crack any user’s password it is, 
obviously, widely used to try to obtain the 
administrator password, which is usually associated 
to typical usernames like admin, root, webmaster, 
webadmin, administrator, among others. 
• The dictionary attack uses a file of common 
passwords (including common application shipped 
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default ones) to try to check if any one of them is the 
correct one. This is certainly the quickest method, if 
the dictionary is well chosen [26]. 
2) Admin Takeover 
These exploits attack the eighth most common web 
application risk of the OWASP top ten 2010 list [10]: 
“Failure to Restrict URL Access”. They attack a bug in the 
application logic that allows unauthenticated or normal users 
to execute a function that should only be accessible to 
administrators. We found three exploits like this that allow 
any registered user to create a new administrator account. 
For example, the “PHP-Nuke v7.4 admin exploit (old 
exploit)”, by Silentium [18], uses the following C code as 
parameters of the admin.php page: 
add_aid=%s&add_name=morte&add_pwd=%s&S
ubmit=Create+Admin 
This C code, whose %s parts are replaced by the name 
and password provided by the attacker, makes PHP-Nuke 
create a new administrator account. Afterwards, the attacker 
can log in using this new account and take complete control 
of the web application.  A regular user should not have 
access to the admin.php page. To prevent these kinds of 
problem, developers should check every web page for proper 
authentication and authorization. 
3) SQL Injection 
These exploits attack the most common web application 
risk of the OWASP top ten 2010 list [10]: “Injection”. 
Except the exploits described previously, all the other 
exploits we analyzed take advantage of unchecked input 
fields at user interface. 
In the case of SQL Injection, the exploit alters the SQL 
query that is sent to the back-end database to manipulate 
sensible data. We found that nearly 2/3 of the 102 SQL 
Injection exploits analyzed use the SQL UNION clause to 
obtain database data. The idea of this particular attack is to 
append a second query to an already existing one for which 
the results will be displayed by the web browser. 
For example, the “PHP-Fusion Mod TI (id) Remote SQL 
Injection Vulnerability”, by IRCRASH [18] is an exploit for 
the PHP-Fusion application. This web application has a 
function that is used to show in the browser the blog that has 
the identification number given by the input GET variable id. 
This variable is vulnerable to SQL Injection and the exploit 




The + signs are just the replacements of the SPACE 
character which cannot be used in a URL. In some other 
exploits the %20 is also used, which corresponds to the 
hexadecimal of the ASCII value of the SPACE character. 
This is a typical SQL Injection attack where a negative 
number is passed to the vulnerable variable so that the first 
query does not return any row. Next, the exploit adds the 
SQL UNION clause and the malicious select that allows 
obtaining the list of user names and respective passwords. 
The last part of the malicious string is the /*, which is the 
indication of the start of a comment in the MySQL language 
(also used in many other databases). This comment sign 
disables the rest of the original SQL query so that the parser 
does not raise any error, therefore rejecting the attack. 
Although the passwords displayed may be encrypted 
with the MD5 or SHA1 hashes, most times they can be 
cracked using a dictionary attack [26, 28], and rainbow 
tables (pre-generated data set of hashes) to speed up the 
attack. SQL Injection is a very important threat, but it is 
easily defended using parameterized interfaces in the web 
application program, through prepared statements and stored 
database procedures [10, 12, 27]. 
4) Cross Site Scripting (XSS) 
These exploits attack the second most common web 
application risk of the OWASP top ten 2010 list [10]: “Cross 
Site Scripting (XSS)”.  We found 16 exploits and although 
we did not find it as frequently as the SQL Injection, XSS 
vulnerability is usually reported as being more common [1, 
10]. To attack a XSS vulnerability, the exploit tweaks the 
vulnerable input variable with a text containing a special 
crafted HTML or scripting language (usually JavaScript). 
XSS exploitation may allow the attacker to do web site 
defacement, steal application cookies allowing the 
impersonation of the victim in the vulnerable web site, etc. 
However, most of XSS exploits analyzed target a more 
dangerous issue: the remote execution of OS commands in 
the web server machine as the root user, if the web server is 
not properly configured (which is usually the case, given the 
huge number of attacks like this). 
An example of this type of attack for the Drupal 
application is the “Drupal < 5.1 (post comments) Remote 
Command Execution Exploit v2”, by str0ke (who is also one 
of the members of the Milw0rm hacking group) [18]. It 
exploits the possibility of posting comments about a given 
blog message, which is a common feature in CMS 
applications. The problem here is that previews of these 
comments are not validated, and they are sent directly to the 
PHP interpreter that executes them and displays the result in 
the attacker web browser. The exploit uses the ability to 
input arbitrary characters in the comment variable to inject a 
PHP malicious string, like this: 
comment=<?passthru('.$byte.');?> 
The passthru() PHP function, similar to the exec() or 
system() functions, or even the ` (backtick operator), 
executes an external command on behalf of the web server 
OS user. The functions passthru() and exec() even allow the 
execution of multiple commands split with semi-colons. The 
$byte is the PHP variable that contains the external command 
the attacker wants to execute. With this exploit the attacker 
can freely manipulate the web server as if he was the owner. 
5) Remote File Inclusion (RFI) 
We found 171 RFI exploits, making them the most 
common type. They attack the third most common 
vulnerability of the OWASP top ten 2007 list [9]: “Malicious 
File Execution”. Like some of the most dangerous XSS 
302
exploits analyzed, the RFI allows arbitrary code execution on 
the server. This is considered one of the methods used by 
hackers to create botnets and serve malware worldwide [7]. 
To exemplify how this exploit operates, let us consider 
the “phpBB Spider Friendly Module <= 1.3.10 File Include 
Exploit”, by Kacper [18]. This attack exploits the vulnerable 
variable phpbb_root_path. The phpBB uses this variable 
extensively in the source code in sentences like this: 
require($phpbb_root_path . 'config.' . 
$phpEx); 
Besides the require(), RFI exploits can use all PHP file 
and stream functions: include(), include_once(), require(), 
require_once(), fopen(), imagecreatefromXXX(), file(), 
file_get_contents(), copy(), delete(), unlink(), 
upload_tmp_dir(), $_FILES and move_uploaded_file() [9]. 
In a normal execution of the application, the file 
represented by the $phpbb_root_path is concatenated with 
config.php ($phpEx variabe is php by default) to be parsed 
and executed by the PHP interpreter. Although not intended 
by the normal use of the phpBB, it is possible to assign to the 
$phpbb_root_path variable something like 
http://www.evilsite.com/shell.txt. Using this in the require() 
function makes the PHP interpreter try to execute the file 
http://www.evilsite.com/shell.txtconfig.php (which is not the 
final goal of the attacker). To overcome the concatenation of 
the config.php to the malicious input, the exploit appends at 
the end the %00 character. This technique is called null byte 
injection (because the %00 character marks the end of the 
string) and it makes the PHP interpreter discard what comes 
next in the string. In this example, the file shell.txt can be a 
simple PHP file stored in the site http://www.evilsite.com 
controlled by the attacker, with the following code: 
<?passthru($_GET["cmd"]);die;?> 
This file executes in the victim’s server computer the 
command that is passed by the GET parameter cmd. So, to 
exploit this vulnerability the attacker can use in the URL of 
the phpBB application something like this: 
phpbb_root_path=http://www.evilsite.co
m/shell.txt?ls%20-las%00 
In this example, the ls -las UNIX command is executed 
and the result is sent to the web browser of the attacker. 
However the payload could be any other command, like the 
netcat (commonly referred to as the Swiss army knife of 
networking), a program that can make the server listen to a 
particular port and run a program like the UNIX shell. This 
way, the attacker can, at any time, connect remotely to the 
server computer through that port. 
Before 2007, the exploitation of this vulnerability type 
was very common in PHP web applications due to 
weaknesses in the default configuration shipped with PHP. 
Nowadays PHP default configuration is much safer than it 
was back in 2007 and critical configuration variables are 
now deprecated, not available or they have safer default 
values (e.g. allow_url_fopen, allow_url_include, 
register_globals). The support of remote file access for some 
functions used by hackers to perform RFI is also restricted 
[29, 13]. These PHP improvements may explain the decrease 
of the current importance of RFI vulnerabilities and their 
removal from the OWASP top ten 2010 list [10]. 
6) Local File Inclusion (LFI) 
We found 18 of these exploits and they attack the fourth 
most common web application risk of the OWASP top ten 
2010 list [10]: “Insecure Direct Object Reference”. The LFI 
allows the attacker to obtain the contents of files stored in the 
server. This is usually achieved by maliciously altering the 
value of a vulnerable variable containing the path of the 
target file. For example, the exploit “Wordpress Plugin Page 
Flip Image Gallery <= 0.2.2 Remote FD Vuln”, by GoLd_M 
[18], is able to obtain the server passwd file (the file with the 
user name and password hashes of the Linux server 
machine). This is done assigning to the vulnerable book_id 
variable the relative path of the target file. For example: 
book_id=../../../../etc/passwd%00123 
At the end of the malicious string there is, once again, the 
null byte injection (using the %00). This attack bypasses the 
naïve use of string concatenation to protect from malicious 
injection, as explained previously. Obviously, if the web 
server is correctly configured then it is not possible to obtain 
files from unwanted locations in the file system. However, 
even in these situations it is usually possible to get valuable 
information from the root of the web application, like source 
code files, configuration files, backup files, etc. If the access 
is not correctly restricted and the application is not well 
managed, the information that can be obtained may be 
enough for the attacker to access critical information (e.g., 
web application user names and passwords that are 
sometimes stored in a XML file in the web server).  
7) HTTP Response Splitting (HTTP-Splitting) 
These exploits were never present in the OWASP top 10 
lists. In the Mitre definition, they are referred as [1]: “CRLF 
(Carriage Return and Line Feed) injection”.  The HTTP-
Splitting attacks web applications in places where there is a 
failure to sanitize HTTP headers for CRLF (%0D%0A or 
\r\n) sequences. We found only a single attack of this type. 
Using this technique, it is possible to force the server to 
consider that the web browser output consists of two 
different HTTP responses, where the latter is the attack [30]. 
To accomplish this objective, the attacker alters the HTTP 
response, for example by adding a Content-Length:  0 to one 
of the HTTP header or POST parameters. Although this is a 
normal HTTP header parameter, using it in this way forces 
the premature end the current HTTP response. Then, the 
attacker places another HTTP response (the malicious one) 
containing a new header and a defaced HTML page that may 
trigger the victim into thinking he was browsing the original 
web application while he is, for example, interacting with the 
attacker’s web page (page hijacking). The user may be then 





IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this section, we present and discuss the results of the 
field study from different points of view, so that we can get a 
profile of the attacker’s perspective. 
A. Exploit Distribution 
Table 1 shows the overall distribution of the exploits 
analyzed across the web applications considered in the study. 
As shown, the four most common vulnerabilities exploited 
are RFI, SQL Injection, LFI and XSS. RFI and SQL 
Injection are undoubtedly the most important in the scenario 
we evaluated as they were found in five out of the six web 
applications analyzed and they contributed to 88% of all 
exploits. We also observe that SQL Injection and RFI are the 
most wanted by the attackers, as they account for 83% of the 
downloads, according to Fig. 1, that shows the overall 
number of downloads for each exploit type. This is 
understandable, as RFI exploits typically provide remote 
access to the server through a root shell [7] and SQL 
Injection is almost the only way to get a direct access to the 
back-end database (which may enable disclosure of user 
names and passwords). However, from Fig. 1, we see that 
SQL Injection exploits are slightly preferred over RFI. These 
SQL Injection attacks give hackers what they want (access to 
data) and there are plenty of vulnerabilities allowing this 
type of attacks on the target web applications [8]. 
In the lower end of the hacker’s usage we have Admin 
Takeover, HTTP-Splitting and Bruteforce/Dictionary. In 
spite of the lower number of exploits released, they have a 
high download rate, as can be seen in Fig. 2. For example, 
the single Bruteforce/Dictionary exploit found in our study 
was downloaded over 45 thousand times. It is a PERL 
program aimed to attack the user password using a brute 
force or a dictionary attack. Although it is meant to exploit 
the phpBB application, it can be easily adapted to other 
applications where a password cracking technique is needed, 
and this may justify part of the interest in downloading it. 
However, the most downloaded exploit (56 thousand times) 
was a SQL Injection one also affecting phpBB. 
The exploits analyzed have an evolution over time, from 
2003 to 2009 with its top at 2006, which can be seen in Fig. 
3. It seems that exploits for the web applications analyzed 
started losing momentum after 2006. This also applies to the 
number of downloads of the exploits, which started very low 
in 2003, reached its peak in 2006 and since then they have 
been decreasing. In the case of SQL Injection exploits, for 
example, they have been increasing until 2008, which was 
the best year with 45 exploits, but that number also 
decreased in 2009 to 12 exploits, which is lower than the 20 
exploits back in 2007. 
Analyzing the spike seen in 2006 we found that 91% is 
due to the 123 RFI exploits that were developed in that year. 
Strangely, 2006 was the first year where RFI exploits were 
observed and the development of these types of exploits 
quickly decreased over the years, reaching only 5 in 2009. 
Some researchers believe that changes introduced in the PHP 
language are the reason for this trend [10] and they may well 
be, because they clearly addressed these types of problems. 
This observation shows the importance of the programming 
language in the security of the application. 
To attack the application the hacker uses its weakest 
point, like plug-ins that are usually not so well developed or 
tested as the main application. We found that nearly 58% of 
exploits target external modules (Fig. 4). This exploitation 
can even be found in plug-ins that are supposed to bring a 
higher level of security to the web application. For example, 
we found security plug-ins phpBB_Security and phpBB 
TABLE I.  EXPLOIT DISTRIBUTION OVER SIX WIDELY USED WEB APPLICATIONS 
 XSS SQL Injection RFI LFI Admin Takeover HTTP-Splitting Bruteforce/Dictionary Total 
Drupal 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 
PHP-Fusion 1 23 0 1 0 0 0 25 
PHP-Nuke 1 29 22 5 1 0 0 58 
phpBB 5 18 129 8 0 0 1 161 
phpMyAdmin 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 5 
Wordpress 5 30 17 3 2 1 0 58 
Total 16 102 171 18 3 1 1 312 
 
Figure 1.  Exploits downloads Figure 2.  Average number of downloads per exploit 
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Security Suite to have RFI vulnerabilities that were 
exploited, allowing an attacker to execute code in the context 
of the web server process. These are paradox situations 
where it is the presence of the security plug-in that 
compromises the whole system they were supposed to 
protect, in a cascading manner. 
B. Exploit Technologies 
Although hackers may need skilled resources to find 
vulnerabilities in web applications, they do not have to know 
much about programming languages to build a common 
exploit. Regarding the technologies used to develop the 
exploits we found that a simple maliciously crafted URL is 
all that it is needed in more than half the times (Fig. 5). In 
particular, GET variables are easier to probe for 
vulnerabilities and to write exploits than POST variables, 
because all it usually takes is to place the malicious string as 
the input of the vulnerable variable directly in the URL. By 
altering the URL, the attacker can control GET variables in a 
low security environment. This usually seems to be the case, 
as we found that unchecked GET variables account for 64% 
of the vulnerabilities exploited. On the other hand, POST 
variables need some sort of programming language that can 
build HTTP requests in order to be exploited in an automated 
fashion, which adds extra complexity. 
For more elaborate exploits that show the result of the 
attack in a user-friendly manner, both GET and POST 
related vulnerabilities are similar in complexity. Other times, 
a programming language is really needed to actually perform 
and automate the attack. This is common in cases where the 
exploit includes counter measures against security 
protections built into the web application or due to the 
specific nature of the vulnerability. For example, in typical 
blind SQL Injection attacks, exploits try to discover every 
character of the user password, one at a time, and the final 
result is shown to the attacker only at the end. 
PERL and PHP are the most chosen programming 
languages to develop the exploits analyzed (Fig. 5). These 
are powerful scripting languages that can be easily used in 
different operating systems, without cross-compilation 
issues. We found that most of the exploits developed with a 
programming language have the code well commented, with 
usage notes and they try to be as user friendly as possible. 
This makes them well suited for the occasional hacker and 
script kiddies. 
Six of the exploits analyzed are already part of the 
collection of exploits of the Metasploit framework [19]. 
These exploits can, therefore, also be executed by every user 
of the Metasploit framework, which can be freely 
downloaded and is present in some Linux distributions 
devoted for security testing, like the BackTrack and the 
Whoppix. From the Milw0rm site only, these six exploits are 
responsible for more than 126 thousand downloads. 
C. Severity Analysis 
The main reason to develop an exploit is the benefit that 
can be achieved by using it against the vulnerable web 
application. This characterizes the severity of the exploit, 
viewed from the web application perspective. It represents 
the level of damage the exploit can inflict to their victims. To 
classify the exploit severity we used the Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) taxonomy [27], 
which is one of the security standards most used nowadays, 
mainly in e-business and e-commerce applications. This 
standard classifies vulnerabilities in 5 levels, from 1 to 5. 
The high-level vulnerabilities are designated 5, 4 or 3, in 
decreasing order. To be compliant with the PCI-DSS 
standard the application cannot have any one of these high-
level vulnerabilities. The following points present a brief 
description of the PCI-DSS severity levels, in line with our 
interpretation of the level of damage that may be obtained 
with the exploits analyzed: 
• Level 5 - Allows the attacker to get read and write 
access to the remote computer as an administrator or 
to the web application database as a DBA. 
• Level 4 - Allows the attacker to get read and write 
access as a regular user (a user that is not an 
administrator nor a DBA) to the remote computer or 
to the web application database. 
Figure 3.  Exploits over time 
Figure 4.  Exploits in main application vs. external plugins 
Figure 5.  Technologies used in the development of the exploits 
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• Level 3 – Allows the access to remote assets without 
permission to change contents. The attacker may see 
remote data (like security settings), files or browsing 
the directory tree. 
• Level 2 - Exposes sensitive information about the 
running programs and services on the server side. 
• Level 1 - Exposes data like server’s open ports. 
In Fig. 6 we present the details of the classification of the 
exploits analyzed according to their PCI-DSS severity. We 
see that 97% of the exploits attack the web application or the 
server in the most damaging way. The number of exploits 
that are classified in a level less than 5 is merely residual. 
Analyzing in detail the exploits classified with level 5 
severity, we found that 97% of them could have been 
classified with level 4, with little system configuration 
change. In fact, even without altering the application code, 
configuration and policy decisions of the administrator of the 
remote server or web application can make the difference 
between level 5 and level 4 or lower for the vast majority of 
exploits. The two most relevant of these best practices issues 
that we found, which are also extensively discussed in 
security literature [12, 27], are the following: 
• Running the web server process with the lowest 
privilege needed - if the web server OS user has 
root privileges, when the account is compromised, 
the attacker can also deploy a remote shell as root. 
We found this in 61% of level 5 severity issues. An 
OS user with the same responsibilities, but having 
only the least amount of privileges needed to 
perform his job conveys a level 4 severity, as he 
would not run as the root user. Preventing the 
execution of external commands from the web 
application completely eliminates the root shell 
problem. Further configuration improvements, like 
restricting the access to the OS file system, reduces 
to level 4 or below even more 5% of level 5 issues. 
• Using a strong administrator account password - 
a weak password may be easily cracked, while a 
strong password may be impossible to obtain using 
current state of the art technologies. Passwords are 
really wanted by hackers, and we found 31% of level 
5 cases due to the exploitation of vulnerabilities that 
expose database passwords. Normally, users do not 
provide strong passwords when they register in 
online web applications. This is a well-known 
security concern and has been discussed over the 
years. Recent results of the whitepaper on consumer 
passwords from Imperva confirm this generalized 
idea [26]. The authors analyzed the largest password 
breach ever, containing around 32 million real 
passwords leaked from the RockYou social network 
application maker. The study shows that users tend 
to choose very weak passwords and it estimates that 
an automated attack can crack one password every 
second, corresponding to 111 attempts, if using a 
carefully chosen dictionary. This may also justify the 
high number of downloads of the 
Bruteforce/Dictionary exploit described earlier. 
D. Vulnerability and Exploit Correlation for XSS and SQL 
Injection 
XSS and SQL Injection are the two most common 
vulnerabilities in web applications [1, 10] and they are also 
very relevant in the exploits analyzed. Fig. 7 shows the 
comparison between XSS and SQL Injection in web 
applications. The leftmost bar presents the distribution of the 
occurrences of XSS and SQL injection in the exploits we 
analyzed; the center bar shows the vulnerabilities from the 
field study presented in [8] for the same target applications; 
and in the rightmost bar presents the vulnerabilities 
disclosed in the MITRE report [1, 4]. 
Analyzing Fig. 7 we can see that web applications are 
more likely to have XSS than SQL Injection vulnerabilities. 
However, when we look at the number of exploits 
developed, less than 14% are for XSS. It seems that, 
although it is easier to find XSS, hackers prefer to exploit 
SQL Injection. We also obtained 17% of XSS downloads 
and 83% of SQL Injection (Fig. 1), when comparing only 
these two exploits. 
Fig. 8 compares the XSS and SQL Injection exploits 
found for each web application with the number of 
vulnerabilities analyzed in [8]. Values are expressed in 
percentages so that we can easily compare and discuss the 
relative distribution of exploits and vulnerabilities. We see 
little relation between the distribution of vulnerabilities and 
the respective developed exploits. We do not have further 
data that can help justify this observation, but we can present 
Figure 6.  PCI severity level of the exploits analyzed Figure 7.  XSS vs. SQL Injection vulnerabilities and exploits 
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some thoughts on this matter: 
• Some of the reported vulnerabilities may be too hard 
to be exploited or not be exploitable at all as the web 
application may have other protection schemes or 
the originating bug may have been mistakenly 
reported as a vulnerability. 
• Some of the vulnerabilities found may only be 
exploited in a manner that does not give attackers 
access to the resources they want. 
• When hackers have many vulnerabilities at their 
disposal, they do not have to exploit all of them, as 
their goal may be achieved by exploiting only a 
subset of those vulnerabilities. 
• Some web applications are more interesting to 
exploit than others. For example, phpMyAdmin 
exploits are usually only available to those who have 
privileges to administer MySQL databases. If a 
vulnerability can only be exploited after having 
granted access to the admin pages, only the admin 
can benefit from it. However, the phpMyAdmin 
admin already has full access to the databases, 
making the use of the exploit pointless. 
• Some web applications have a larger market share 
than others. From a cost/benefit ratio, it is more 
interesting to invest time and money exploiting those 
who give a better perspective of success in a wider 
number of possible victims. 
E. Analysis of the Attacker Perspective 
As expected, we observed that an attacker typically tries 
to exploit vulnerabilities that can empower him with an 
administrator account, whether it is an OS root shell or a 
DBA database password. However, it was a surprise that this 
accounted for so many exploits (97%, as seen in Fig. 6). 
There are vulnerabilities that may provide a path to assets 
more sensitive than others and these are clearly what hackers 
are looking for to develop their exploits. This demand for 
high-damaging exploits may help justify why the number of 
vulnerabilities and exploits do not always have a direct 
relationship (Fig. 8). By comparing XSS with SQL Injection 
we see that the attacker normally prefers SQL Injection (Fig. 
1), although XSS is typically easier to find: apparently, the 
access to the database records pays off the extra effort. 
Our results show that in a vast majority of vulnerable 
web applications, the attacker can get access to the server, 
exploiting LFI and RFI vulnerabilities. Besides good 
configuration practices [12, 27, 29, 13], security practitioners 
are advised to build a combination of web application, 
network and OS defense layers. This is known as Defense In 
Depth [31]. 
Although there are some complex exploits written in a 
programming language, surprisingly the attacker can achieve 
its objectives nearly half of the time with simple resources, 
like a crafted URL (Fig. 5). We also observed the search for 
simplicity reflected by the higher number of GET variables 
attacked when compared with POST variables.  
To improve the attack success ratio, hackers not only 
want to increase the ability to access important assets, but 
also to decrease the chance of getting caught. They want to 
attack their victims remaining hidden behind another identity 
or by executing the attack stealthy. To achieve this, they can 
use public computers (from schools, libraries, cyber cafés, 
etc.), computers from botnets they own (they remotely 
control) or even use anonymizer proxy server solutions, like 
Tor (torproject.org) and UltraSurf (ultrareach.com). An 
anonymizer proxy does not transmit the client IP information 
and does not store any information about the client when he 
is surfing the web. When using these kinds of proxies in a 
web attack, there are no traces that can help identify the 
attacker. It allows the attacker to stay anonymous, even when 
digital forensics is in place. The possibility to configure the 
use of proxies in the attack is available in some more 
elaborated exploits, which shows the concern of hackers 
about this matter. 
During our analysis, it was possible to observe the 
consecutive exploitation of the same vulnerable variable over 
and over again. For example, in the phpBB web application, 
we found exploits of the phpbb_root_path variable from 
February 2006 to April 2007. During this period, 110 
exploits were developed to attack that same variable (this is 
the reason for the high number of RFI exploits in 2006). 
Many of these exploits targeted different external modules of 
the phpBB application, which also raises the question about 
the quality of external plug-ins and components, which may 
compromise the security of the whole application. In fact, to 
achieve higher security, software developers should perform 
a thorough analysis and have a holistic thinking of the 
problem. These 110 RFI exploits target a vulnerable variable 
with the same name, but in different source code files. It 
seems that the PHP in these files was written reutilizing 
common code, maybe using copy & paste. The discovery of 
a vulnerability should trigger the developers into searching 
for problems in other locations too. 
We also found in many situations that, after the fix, a 
slight change in the old exploit is all that is needed to bypass 
the new counter-measures and build a new exploit. This 
suggests that developers should revise the review procedures 
used during the correction of the vulnerabilities [12, 27, 32]. 
For the attackers, the weak actions done by the developers 
are welcomed. They only have to tweak the exploit and 
probe for the same vulnerabilities in all the places where the 
target variables are in use. 
Figure 8.  Vulnerabilities and exploits across web applications  
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V. CONCLUSION 
This paper analyzes over three hundred exploits, of six 
widely used LAMP web applications, which were 
downloaded by possible attackers over three million times. 
The exploit code and metadata was manually reviewed 
focusing on aspects that contribute to profile typical 
operations and the hacker perspective. Results provide 
insights that can be used to improve web application security 
from software developer to administrator actions. 
We can see that attackers benefit from poorly developed 
web applications and weak server and application 
configurations. Most of the exploits analyzed are just crafted 
URLs or simple scripts in PERL or PHP that allow even non-
experts to deploy them easily. However, their critical damage 
can also be mitigated using common security best practices, 
such as using the latest software versions (e.g. newer PHP 
releases address some critical security problems), using 
strong passwords and deploying services with low privileges. 
We found that attackers typically use only a restricted 
subset of the existing vulnerabilities as RFI and SQL 
Injection account for almost 90% of exploits analyzed. In 
fact, by applying a limited set of procedures that exploits the 
most common vulnerabilities, hackers target the most 
important assets of web applications, which are administrator 
accounts and remote shell access to servers. This is inline 
with other studies that concluded that only a small 
percentage of software bug types accounted for the vast 
majority of web application vulnerabilities. 
Observations show that security procedures executed 
when an exploit is found are far from being effective, and 
they must be urgently addressed. Results can also be useful 
for those interested in understanding what web attackers 
want and how they operate. This helps to improve security 
related mechanisms, like attack simulators, penetration 
testing tools, procedures and training.  
As future work this seminal study should be extended to 
capture the relationship between exploit sites, cover web 
applications developed with other technologies and correlate 
them to see if attackers follow a common pattern. 
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